ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks consists of low-cost, low-power and multifunctional sensor nodes that work together to sense the surrounding environment. Some sensors have a capability to perform data processing. Due to the instructive nature of WSNs, they are exposed to many attacks like Wormhole attack [1] , Sybil attack [2] , Black-hole attack [3] and Jamming attack [4] etc. As wireless signals travel through shared medium, an adversary can inject false messages or emit radio frequency (RF) signals in order to prevent authenticated wireless devices from communicating with each other. Fig 1: Types of Jammers Figure 1 shows several types of jammers namely constant jammer, deceptive jammer, random jammer, reactive jammer. The constant jammer [5] emits unwanted radio signals to the wireless medium. This jammer keeps the channel busy preventing valid nodes from communicating with each other. The deceptive jammer [6] uses misleading jamming techniques to attack the wireless sensor nodes. The random jammer [7] is inactive state for an arbitrary time and make itself active to jam the network for an arbitrary time. The reactive jammer [8] listens for on-going activity on the channel if so it will send unwanted data to its neighbouring nodes otherwise it will be in sleep mode.
Different Jamming Attacks

Characteristics of Reactive Jammer Model
The reactive jammer wakes up only when there is an on-going transmission on the channel otherwise it remains in sleep mode. The reactive jamming happens in such a way that the WSN's are not immediately aware of it. The WSN might detect failure of communication easily but detection of jammer attack is complicated. Reactive jamming attacks are considered one of the most intelligent jamming strategies. The reactive jamming attack in figure 2 is one such DoS security threat in which a malicious node (jammer) quietly scans all the available channels in a wireless network to sense any activity. If a signal is detected from a legitimate node on any channel, the reactive jammer starts injecting noise on that channel in order to interfere with all the receivers in its range. This results in a drastic decrease in the signal to noise ratio and drop in the communication throughput of the network.
Reactive Jamming
IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH
Network Model and Jammer Model
The wireless sensor network have n sensor nodes with a base station (depends on the size of the network).Each sensor node has omni-directional antennas with limited energy, memory storage and computational capabilities along with r radios that adds up to a total of k channels throughout the network, where k>r. The reactive jammer nodes can sense an ongoing transmission on the network to decide whether to launch a bad signal or not depending on the power of the sensor signal. Here an internal attacker model is used, in which the malicious nodes send unwanted data to its neighboring and wants to participate in the network activities. This selfish nodes decreases the network throughput by corrupting the valid packet. Based on jamming status, the sensor nodes made into four types as shown in Figure 3 .Trigger Node TN is a sensor node which makes the jammer to awakes, victim nodes VN are sensor nodes within the range R of jammer, boundary nodes BN and unaffected nodes are free from the jammers.
Sensor model
VARIOUS DETECTION METHODS FOR REACTIVE JAMMING
Transmitter-Based Detection
Different detection approaches of reactive jamming exist. For example , a network node A sending a signal to node B is considered. To apply the decision algorithm [9] the transmitter has to determine the following three metrics, a)PDR (Packet Delivery Ratio): Traditional approaches for the detection of jamming in wireless sensor networks use the packet delivery-ratio (PDR) and the received ambient signal strength as the main decision criteria. Jamming is detected as soon as the (averaged) PDR exceeds a predefined threshold. Although these approaches are well-suited for the detection of proactive (longterm) jamming, they are not sufficient for protection against targeted reactive jamming. At the transmitter side, the PDR can be calculated by how many acknowledgements it receives and total number of ACK received.
PDR sender = Total number of ACK received by sender 
SNR= Signal power ------------------Noise power
Receiver-Based Detection
The main difference between receiver-based and transmitter-based detection lies in the computation of the PDR. Although in transmitter based detection, the transmitter knows the exact number of data frames sent. This information is not known a priori at the receiver since several frames might get lost during transmission. Therefore, it is necessary that the data frames contain additional information which enables the receiver to determine the total number of sent frames. This can be achieved by adding a sequence number to every single data frame.
Dedicated Detection
In case of dedicated detection, the RSSI and PHY rate are read from the acknowledgement frames arriving from the receiver, i.e. node B. The noise level is taken from arbitrary frames arriving at the monitor. Based on the gathered statistics over several ACK frames, the monitor then applies the decision algorithm. Finally, the node responsible for jamming detection announces his decision to the other participating nodes in a broadcast frame. This broadcasting is then repeated whenever the decision changes in future.
Cooperative Detection
This detection scheme is the combination of all the previous three strategies. In this case, the technique is to share all the information at all nodes with each other and to make a decision based on this broader view. This means that every participating node in the ad hoc network gathers its own information, independently using any of the above techniques and shares the data with its neighbours. For detecting the reactive jammers, every sensor node periodically sends a control details message to the base station. There is a possibility that jammers may be activated during this period . Because of this event occurred on the network, the victim nodes will not send the control message to the base station based on this the base station can decide whether reactive jamming attack has occurred in the network or not by comparing the received report messages to a perstored threshold. When the status report message is generated by each sensor node, they can locally obtain their jamming status to determine the value of the label field. If the sensor node hears the jamming signals, it will not send the messages to base station, but will initialise the label as Victim. On the other hand, if the sensor node cannot sense jamming signals, its report will be sent to the base station as normally expected. However, the sensor node is labelled as boundary node in its status report if it does not receive the ACK from its neighbour node on the next hop of the route within a time out period. It retries for two more retransmissions.
Proposed Algorithm for Efficient Detection
If the status report is successfully delivered to the base station with label Boundary Node, the corresponding node is regarded as unaffected. All the messages are queued in the buffer of the intermediate nodes and forwarded in an FCFS manner. The TTL value is reduced by 1 per hop for each message, and the message will be dropped once its TTL = 0. The base station waits for the status report from each node in a period of length P. If no reports have been received from a node v with a maximum delay time, then v will be regarded as victim.
DIFFERENT APPROACHES FOR ISOLATING THE REACTIVE JAMMER
Avoidance Techniques
Channel Hopping
When jammed, communicating nodes hop on to a new channel independently and try to get synchronized with other participants. However, when any node is unable to communicate for a certain period of time, it starts listening on other channels in order to sense whether its neighbouring nodes have hopped on due to jamming or not. Another technique worth mentioning in this regard that provides urgent and robust response to the jamming attack is known as MULEPRO(MULti channel Exfiltration Protocol [11] ). It is designed to quickly exfiltrate the sensed data from jammed region to the area which is currently in the jammed area. This technique is suitable for many types of network applications like perimeter and infrastructure defence system, homeland security systems, battlefield sensing systems etc.
Spatial Retreat
Spatial retreat is a mechanism to physically evade the jammed area. The rationale behind this strategy is that all nodes try to estimate the jammed region based on the detection algorithm and flee physically to a safer place. Based on their estimation about the jammed region, nodes independently opt for shortest path to avoid being jammed and move accordingly.
i. Jammed Area Mapping (JAM)
This mechanism employs scattered approach to draw the jammed area so communication with that part of the network node can be avoided during specification of routes . Once, legitimate nodes are out of the jammed region, they try to relocate to unaffected areas and hence, may change their direction and speed according to the predefined algorithm [12] .
ii. Node Escape
This technique is for the physical escape of the node from the jamming location. The Main requirement is to move away from the jammed area and periodically sense the medium if it has become interference free. This procedure is repeated till node reaches to an unaffected location [13] .
Other Techniques
Another strategy targets prediction of nodes which are about to be jammed and hence should be removed from routing in a wireless network. This strategy uses LEACH [14] as its base routing protocol and uses JAM for predictive determination of jamming holes.
DEEJAM [15] protocol is an amalgamation of frame masking, channel hopping, packet fragmentation and redundant encoding in order to avoid all four types of jamming classes. DEEJAM is effective in reducing pulse jam attack. However the extra computational overhead in these approaches is unresolved. Swarm intelligence is yet another strategy finding its popularity in field of wireless routing. One such Swarm based methodology is simulation of ants behaviour in path translation to a food source. This method is very effective and energy efficient as it is based on a natural process of pheromone laying to determine optimum routes. However implementation details of this process are pretty complex, as volatility of this process and intelligent learning is little difficult to model.
Proposed Algorithms for Isolating the Reactive Jammer
This paper proposes a fresh implementation move towards defence of the network against reactive jamming attack i.e. trigger identification service. This approach attempts to reduce the transmission overhead as well as the time complexity. The advantage that this approach seeks to achieve is the elimination of additional hardware .The requirement of the mechanism is to send simple status report messages from each sensor and the information regarding the geographic locations of all sensors maintained at the base station. The identification of the trigger nodes can help to design a better routing protocol by making these nodes only receivers to avoid the reactive jammers. In this work, an isolation of reactive jammers can be done by identifying the trigger nodes through the group testing technique. The Figure4 shows overall operation of the proposed algorithm for reactive jamming attack. The set of sufferer nodes is first identified and grouped into several testing teams. Once the group testing is made at the base station testing procedure is executed locally to identify the node as a trigger or non trigger. The identification outcomes can be stored locally for routing schemes or can be sent to base station for jamming localization process.
Trigger Detection By Using Group Testing
To find all trigger nodes in the network, the sensor nodes need to broadcast one by one and listen to the feasible jamming signal. But this individual detection method increases the time complexity for the detection in a large pool of victim nodes. this method may return wrong detection values in the presence of mobile jammers. In this case, the network throughput would be significantly decreased. Therefore, to precisely find out these triggers from a large pool of victim nodes is the most challenging part of the proposed protocol, for which the idea of group testing can be applied. The reactive jammers immediately broadcast jamming signals once it senses the sensor signal. Here the assumption made is that, at least one of the broadcasting wounded nodes is a trigger, which will sense part of the jamming signals, and vice versa. The encrypted testing schedule is executed over all the victim nodes after it has been designed at the base station based on the set of boundary nodes and stored as a message (shown in Table 1) which is broadcasted to all the boundary nodes. The broadcasting of the testing schedule message adopts a routing mechanism similar to reverse path forwarding as shown in Figure 5 . All the status report messages relayed to the base station will record all the nodes' IDs on their routing paths. After receiving this message from base station, each boundary node broadcasts this message using simple flooding method to its nearby jammed area. All the victim nodes execute the testing schedule and designate themselves as nontriggers or triggers. Table 1 shows that in each time slot t, v sets of victim sensors can be tested. The selection of these sets involves a two-level grouping procedure.
First-level, the entire set of victims are divided into several interference-free testing groups. Here, interference free means that the transmissions of the victim nodes in one testing group should not interfere with the other victim node transmission cited in a different testing group. Therefore, by attempting broadcast from victim nodes in each testing group and monitoring the jamming signals it can be concluded that any members in this group are triggers. In addition, all the tests schedule messages can be executed by all victim nodes simultaneously without interference from each other.
Second-level, within each testing team, victim nodes are further divided into multiple testing groups. This is can be done by creating a randomized disjunction matrix [16] mapping, where each column is a sensor node and each matrix row is a testing group. This work proves that all the testing teams are interference free, then the testing with different teams can be executed simultaneously. Message complexity will be reduced by considering information of boundary and victim nodes as input.
SIMULATION RESULT
The simulation result shows the performance evaluation of end-to-end delay and throughput of the network. Preventing reactive jammers by trigger identification service is simulated using network simulator NS2 on 900×900 square filed with n=10 sensor nodes. Each sensor node has to send control information to the base station periodically for every five seconds, this makes the reactive jammer to wake up and start sending random signal to its neighbouring nodes. Reactive jammer is selected randomly for the purpose of simulation from a large set of sensor nodes. Due to this, victim nodes won't send control information to the base station. After that base station calculates the jammed area and the reactive jammer on the network based on boundary node and global topology status. Isolation is done by identifying the trigger node in a large set of victim nodes. The victim node broadcast control information to identify that it has been jammed through labelling themselves as trigger node. Trigger nodes are then configured as only receiver so that jammer do not wake up.
End-to -End Delay
The end-to-end delay is defined as difference between the time at which the packet is received the base station minus the actual time at which the packet is sent. End-to-End delay shown in the Figure 6 , as the number of nodes increases, delay is not gradually increased. 
Throughput
The throughput(unit of throughput is Mbps) of the network is shown in Figure 7 with varying number of nodes. The simulation results illustrate that when the number of sensor nodes increases the better throughput is achieved. 
CONCLUSION
In this paper, a trigger identification service for reactive jamming attack in wireless sensor network is simulated to achieve minimum end-to-end delay and to increase the throughput of the network. It has been shown that delay is reduced by using group testing method. Trigger identification requires all testing groups to schedule the detection algorithm and after that performed group testing for isolating reactive jammers. Furthermore, investigation into more stealthy and energy efficient jamming models with simulations indicates robustness of the present proposed scheme.
